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A PARTIAL LEGACY OF SUPREME COURT
PRESIDENT AHARON BARAK
Markus Wagner*
1.

INTRODUCTION

In 2006, Aharon Barak, then President of the Supreme Court of Israel, assigned a
group of clerks the task of comparing the response of legal systems to the question of
prison privatization. The exercise, performed by half a dozen law students and lawyers
from almost as many countries, produced an overview of not only the legal rules
pertaining to the question of prison privatization, but also gave insight into the rationale
for why different countries craft legal rules that sometimes differ to a considerable
extent. While some courts have the occasional foreign law clerk, it is rare for a court to
have a significant number of them. More importantly, this exercise was a reflection of a
characteristic that makes the Supreme Court of Israel stand out among other similarly
placed institutions. Generally and for historical reasons, but increasingly under the tenure
of President Barak, the Supreme Court of Israel has made considerable use of foreign
law in its decision-making process. This came about by and large due to the
constitutional fabric of the country at its origin, in addition to the formation of the
country's legal community.' But the frequency with which the Supreme Court used
comparative law methods in its decision-making took an unprecedented turn during his
tenure.
In order to investigate the legacy of former President Barak, this paper explores the
framework designed by Anne-Marie Slaughter on what she called "transjudicial
communication," a concept she later coined as "transnational judicial dialogue." 2 It then
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, formerly clerk to then-President
Aharon Barak of the Supreme Court of Israel. Email: mwagner a law.miami.edu. I am grateful to Miriam
Bitton, Daphne Erez-Barak, Patrick Gudridge, Avi Milikovsky and Yishai Mishor for comments on previous
drafts. Tess Deliefde, Alexis Riordan and Alexander Roth provided valuable research assistance.
1. Foundations of Law, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 181 (1948-1989) (lsr.). There is considerable latitude to use
comparative law as evidenced by Article 1 of the Foundations of Law which lists the sources the Supreme
Court may turn to in its decision-making: "Where the court, faced with a legal question requiring decision,
finds no answer to it in statute law or case-law or by analogy, it shall decide it in the light of the principles of
freedom, justice, equity and peace of Israel's heritage." Id. Traditionally, this language has been interpreted
broadly, although there is disagreement about the meaning of the provision. See generally Pablo Lerner &
Alfredo Mordechai Rabello, The (Re)Codification of Israeli Private Law: Support for, and Criticism of the
IsraeliDraft Civil Law, Code, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 763 (2011); A. David Pardo, JudicialDiscretionin Talmudic
Times and the Modern Era, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 429, 449 (2009).
2. See Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State
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expands this framework to demonstrate the true impact of President Barak's work. While
the original conception of transnational judicial dialogue was developed for different
purposes, it is a useful tool in exploring the impact of the justice and the scholar Aharon
Barak. This framework cannot adequately account for President Barak's work outside of
the courtroom however, which was a realm of influence just as important as the
traditional categories of transnational judicial dialogue in understanding his
jurisprudence. His contributions outside of the courtroom include his scholarly writing,
his teaching at many prestigious institutions around the world, and his virtual
omnipresence at conferences.
This paper will leave aside the question of the propriety of the use of foreign or
international law in the domestic decision-making processes. 3 It is not concerned with
whether a particular court is the leader for other courts adopting its jurisprudence 4 and
does not address the propriety of using comparative law in general or in a particular
setting. There are legitimate arguments on either side of those debates, and some are
more convincing than others.5 It suffices to say, however, that contextualizing one's own
legal system by reference to others and potentially uncovering unstated assumptions,
appears to be a valid form of challenging these assumptions. The purpose of this article
is an analysis of the jurisprudential legacy of President Barak, but it also attempts to
create a framework for analyzing his life's work.
The paper first provides a concise overview of transnational judicial dialogue as it
initially developed (II.). It then develops that framework further by more closely
analyzing the different forms that such transnational judicial dialogue can take. This may
take the form of the well-analyzed open dialogue among members of judicial institutions
to non-open forms of communication in which the participants do not reveal the source
of their reasoning. Moreover and crucially, the impact of personalities such as President
Barak could not be captured by only taking account of the open forms or quasi-open
forms of judicial dialogue. In order to assess the direct and indirect impact on nonjudicial institutions, the paper introduces the concept of "transnational legal
communication" (111.), before offering some concluding remarks (IV.).

Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1923 (1992); Melissa Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 490 (2005).
Waters defines the term as "the engine by which domestic courts collectively engage in the co-constitutive
process of creating and shaping international legal norms and, in turn, ensuring that those norms shape and
inform domestic norms." Id. Note, however, that Waters' definition does not encompass communication
between international institutions and domestic institutions.
3. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES (2003); Carl
Baudenbacher, Foreivord: Globalization of the Judiciary, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 397 (2003); Eyal Benvenisti &
George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy,and the Evolution of InternationalLaw, 20 EUR. J.
INTL L. 59 (2009); Michael Kirby, Transnational Judicial Dialogue, Internationalisationof Law and
AustralianJudges, 9 MELB. J. INT'L L. 171 (2008); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44
HARv. INT'L L.J. 191 (2003).
4. See Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537
(1988); Adam Liptak, American Exception: U.S. Court Is Now, Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, September
18 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html?pagewanted-all. This
appears to be an almost uniquely American preoccupation.
5. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The opposition to foreign law, even
with a limited role, has been famously stated by Justice Antonin Scalia, who noted that "this Court .. . should
not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans." Id. (internal citations omitted).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol47/iss2/9

2

Wagner: Transnational Legal Communication: A Partial Legacy of Supreme Co
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL COMMUNICATION

2011

II.

439

THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE

Far from being a new concept, dialogue between domestic courts has been in
practice for a considerable period of time. The shared heritage of common law countries
has facilitated and necessitated communication between courts of this tradition since
their inception.6 In the civil law world, domestic courts engaged in dialogue even before
the period of codification, which started with the creation of the French Civil Code in the
late 18 th century and its promulgation in 1804. More importantly for present purposes,
many of Europe's highest courts have been communicating with one another since the
end of World War II. This communication sometimes takes place through hierarchical
and somewhat predetermined mechanisms, such as the European Union's Court of
Justice and its predecessors or the Council of Europe's European Court of Human
Rights. On the other hand, courts also communicate directly with one another. 8 This
phenomenon is not confined to these spheres; rather, it has taken on global dimensions. 9
Anne-Marie Slaughter's original concept described a typology of transjudicial
communication modes. With regard to the participants, Slaughter distinguishes between
three different types of communication: 10 (1) horizontal communications between the
highest courts in each constitutional system, such as the use of proportionality testing in
Canada, the so-called Oakes test, which is generally acknowledged to be adopted from
the German Constitutional Court's ("GCC") test of VerhdltnismaJ3igkeit;12 (2) vertical
communication between international/transnational judicial bodies with the traditional
example being communication between the Court of Justice and the courts of the EU
member states regarding the reach of EU law and the competencies of the respective
courts;13 and (3) mixed vertical-horizontal communication modes in which international
or supranational institutions are the lynchpin for the communication among different
6. Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law and the Harmonisationof Private Law in Europe, in

TOWARDS A

EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, 21, 25 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004).

7. Helmut Koziol, Tort Liabiliy in the French 'Code Civil' and the Austrian 'Allgemeines Bfirgerliches
Gesetzbuch,' in THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE ON THE COMMON LAW AND BEYOND 261, 261

(Duncan Fairgrieve ed., 2007).
8.

See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 79 (2004); J.H.H. Weiler, The

Transformation ofEurope, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
9. Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 793 (1997); Sujit
Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional
Interpretation,74 IND. L.J. 819, 821 (1999).
10. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 103-12
(1994).
I1. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
12. See generally Dieter Grimm, Proportionalityin Canadian and German ConstitutionalJurisprudence,
57 U. TORONTO L.J. 383 (2007) (analyzing and comparing the development of the Canadian and German
standards).
13. See generally,e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974, 2
C.M.L.R. 540, 1974 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1986,
3 C.M.L.R. 225, 1987 (Ger.). These two decisions by the German Constitutional Court, the so-called Solange I
and Solange II decisions, dealt with the issue of supremacy of European law. Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 1994 (Ger.). This was the so-called
Masstricht decision. On the Maastricht decision, see generally Joachim Wieland, Germany in the European
Union---The Maastricht Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 5 EURO. J. INTL. L. 259 (1994). See
generally J.H.H. Weiler, The State "iber alles" Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision (Jean
Monnet Ctr. for Int'l & Reg'l Econ. Law & Justice N.Y Univ. School of Law, Working Paper No. 6/95, 1995).
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jurisdictions. It should be noted, however, that the classification of these relationships as
horizontal, vertical, or mixed may be debatable, depending on whether one regards the
relationship between the highest courts in the countries belonging to the Council of
Europe and the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") as belonging to one
constitutional framework. Furthermore, EU law, especially under Article 267 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") (ex-Article 234; previously
Article 177), mandates that domestic courts submit a case to the Court of Justice for a
preliminary ruling, thereby requiring the courts to engage with one another. 14
Slaughter refines her model by outlining the different degrees to which courts can
engage with one another: (1) through direct dialogue between the different courts, where
the communication is overt; (2) through a monologue, where the communication is onesided and the originator may not be aware that its decision has been used; and (3)
through what Slaughter refers to as "intermediated dialogue," where international or
supranational courts or entities facilitate dialogue between domestic institutions. 15
Moving away from the structural and mechanical elements of communication,
Slaughter
describes the functions of transjudicial dialogue.16 On the
international/supranational level, she proposes that dialogue engages domestic courts in a
quest for increased legitimacy, which enhances their work through increased
effectiveness and adherence to international obligations. But more importantly, this
process serves to disseminate ideas between both international and domestic
jurisdictions. 17 This type of communication, labeled "cross-fertilization," is the least
formal because it "requires little direction or targeting."' 8 The recipient is able to
disregard the information entirely or absorb it with or without acknowledgement of the
source. The critics of the use of comparative law in judicial decision-making find crossfertilization to be the most problematic type of communication. It is viewed as an
illegitimate use of non-domestic sources in decision-making that is supposed to be
responsive to the domestic polity.
A final function of transjudicial communication is what Slaughter labels
"collective deliberation," a process in which various actors engage in a discourse over
common problems.1 9 By its nature, this type of communication takes place in formalized
systems (or relationships), but it is harder to find evidence of it in purely horizontal
relationships. This is evident from the examples that Slaughter provides, largely focusing
on the Court of Justice and the ECtHR. 20

14. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 267, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 164.
15. Slaughter, supra note 10, at 113-14.
16. Id. at 114-22. For a different typology, differentiating between three models of resistance, convergence
and engagement, see Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement,
119 HARV. L. REV. 109,112-14 (2005).
17. Slaughter, supra note 10, at 116-18.
18. Id.at117-18.
19. Id. at 119.
20. Id. at 120-22.
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OR

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL COMMUNICATION

The original conception oftransjudicial communication was largely confined to the
modes of communication between judges that can be traced through the official
pronouncements in the publications of the courts. Just as important, however, are the
modes of communication that are harder to trace, which Ronald Krotoszynski calls the
"weak forms" of international judicial dialogue.21 These open and "weak forms", as well
as other modes of communication are what this paper introduces as "transnational legal
communication."22 As numerous authors have pointed out, it is oftentimes difficult, if
not impossible, to trace the processes by which argumentative processes have evolved.
Nevertheless, this article attempts to paint a picture of the work President Barak has done
over the last decades by way of examples and by expanding the original conception of
transnational judicial communication where necessary. It should not come as a surprise
that President Barak has been a prolific member of most of these transnational legal
communication mechanisms.

A.

Open DialogueBetween Domestic Courts

The category of open dialogue between domestic judicial institutions is the most
prevalent form of transnational legal communication. Within the European Union, it is
partially constitutionally mandated between domestic courts and the Court of Justice. 23
Among European countries, this topic has been studied in greater detail, as evidenced by
a study on cross-citations among ten European supreme courts.24 Based on over half a
million decisions, the authors arrived at a number of conclusions. There are certain
jurisdictions from which particular courts appear to prefer to borrow dialogue (seven out
of ten). This may be traced back to familiarity with language and through sharing a

21. Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., "I'dLike to Teach the World to Sing (in Perfect Harmony) ": International
Judicial Dialogue and the Muses Reflections on the Perils and the Promise of International Judicial
Dialogue, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1321, 1325 (2006) (reviewing JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY: AN
INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION (Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer eds., 2004)).
22. The true impact of a court's or an individual justice's influence outside the judicial realm has not been
taken up by the original design. This was not a necessary task, given the aspiration of the proponents of that
model, such as "building regional and, perhaps, ultimately global communities of law." Laurence R. Helfer &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 391
(1997).
23. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 267, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 164.
24. See generally Martin Gelter & Mathias M. Siems, Networks, Dialogue or One-Way Traffic? An
EmpiricalAnalysis of Cross-Citations between Ten European Supreme Courts (Maastricht Eur. Private Law
Inst., Working Paper No. 2011/03 & Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No.1722721, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722721; Martin Gelter & Mathias M. Siems, Language, Legal Origins,
and Culture before the Courts: Cross-Citations between Supreme Courts in Europe (Fordham Law Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 1719183, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1719183. See also Eyal
Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts,
102 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 253 (2008) (noting that the jurisdictions of the majority of the cases these courts
adjudicate, only in rare cases, touch on politically sensitive areas where governments' interests are directly
implicated).
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common legal heritage, such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.25 However, that
type of communication is not necessarily a two-lane street, as in the case of Austria and
Switzerland, where the communication appears to be inbound rather than outbound. 26
This example forms the basis of another conclusion; namely, that certain countries
appear to be part of the center, such as France, Germany, and England, while some are
considerably less connected with others occupying the middle ground, though none of
the countries under review are unconnected. 27 As with other studies, there are certain
factors that lead to uncertainties when interpreting the results. E.g., some judges are more
explicit than others about the origin of their influence.28 In addition, cross-citations
cannot lead to a conclusion these citations even actually had an influence.
Considerable use of cross-referencing has been made in decisions concerning antiterrorist measures in the wake of September 11, 2001.29 This development can be
observed in countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Israel, Germany, France, and
New Zealand. Most famously, this development in the European Court of Justice's
decision in Kadi 130 was rather unsurprising. Owing to the common origin and similar
way of implementing these anti-terrorist measures - a considerable number of which
are based on S/RES/137331 - and given the curtailing of civil liberties these measures
created, it was almost natural that a review of these anti-terrorist measures and, at least
implicitly, the power of the Security Council to mandate them would occur. Courts,
which are connected through either formal or informal networks and interpret similar
language while weighing these measures against fundamental principles of democracy
and liberty, will inevitably look at the jurisprudence of courts in other countries. 32
Another example was a case in which President Barak was originally involved, in
which comparative law ultimately played an overt role.33 Sitting as the High Court of
Justice in late 2009, the Court, after considerable public debate, found the privatization
of prisons, as envisioned by the Knesset, was unconstitutional. The case was originally
slated to be decided in 2006 while President Barak was still in office. However, the
Knesset decided to reconsider the question late in the summer of 2006. Because
President Barak was about to retire, he could not participate in the decision. 34 In an 8-1
25. For an example where both "rational" explanations, such as language barriers, lack of time, "cultural"
explanations, and decisional tradition, appear to prevent courts from cross-referencing each other, see Dr.
Helene Lambert, TransnationalJudicialDialogue, Harmonizationand the Common European Asylum System,
58 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 519, 533-35 (2009). But see the bourgeoning use of cross-reference in Irish refugee law
in Siobhan Mullally, Speaking Across Borders: The Limits andPotentialof TransnationalDialogue on Refugee
Law in Ireland, in THE LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW: REFUGEE LAW, POLICY HARMONIZATION AND

JUDICIAL DIALOGUE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 150, 166-67 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Helene Lambert eds.,

2010).
26. Gelter & Siems, Networks, Dialogue or One-Way Traffic? An Empirical Analysis of Cross-Citations
between Ten European Supreme Courts, supra note 24, at 8.
27. See id. at 14 fig. 5.
28. Id. at 17-18.
29. Benvenisti, supra note 24, at 255-56.
30. Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council & Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3649.
31. See generally S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
32. For further examples, see Benvenisti, supra note 24, at 255-56.
33. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus. v. Minister of Fin. [2009] (Isr.), available at
http://www.privateci.org/private_pics/Israel Ruling.pdf.
34. See Yuval Yoaz, Knesset Given Six Months to Decide on PrisonPrivatization, HAARETZ, Jan. 9, 2006,
www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/knesset-given-six-months-to-decide-on-prison-privatization-1.196305.
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decision, the Supreme Court decided that because of the profit motive of private
contractors, the transfer of authority for prison management to a private contractor
violated the constitutional principles of human rights and dignity. 35
There are a host of interesting issues surrounding this case: the exercise of inherent
govermnental functions by entrusting them to private parties; whether liberty and dignity
are the right "hooks" for making these arguments; whether there was another way to
reach the same goal rather than inventing a "right against privatization"; whether it is
cheaper to house prisoners through private contractors and if so, what non-economic
costs are incurred; whether courts should decide the latter question; and to what extent
the political process prevented judgment from being rendered earlier.36 All of these
questions are contentious, and oftentimes, countries that have considered them have
found very different answers. The court's use of the comparative research in the final
decision is relatively modest and does not go into great detail. The research focuses on
the experiences of the United States and the United Kingdom in privatizing prisons but
distinguishes them from the situation in Israel. Furthermore, the court encountered
difficulty in finding partners with which to communicate in other countries. The situation
in Germany and France was such that the governments had rejected, partially on
constitutional grounds, the privatization of prisons or only allowed privatization to an
extent that made it unfeasible for private partners. Additionally, the idea of handing over
imprisonment, considered to be a core function of government with attendant political
responsibility and democratic accountability challenges, 37 was considered to be contrary
to the constitutional and political culture. This notion explains the difficulty in finding
cases outside of countries that historically have had a longer track record of privatizing
incarceration.38 The decision may, however, serve a different function in the context of
transnational legal communication. As the first decision of its kind to outright reject
prison privatization, it may well set the tone for adjudication of this question in other
countries in the future.
Sensible comparison is only possible between countries with a common
ideological basis. 39 Even in those instances, however, it is sometimes difficult to
ascertain the true workings of the court, as courts from neighboring countries sometimes
do not possess enough contexts to reliably evaluate judgments. 40 This view is reflected
41
domestically in Justice Breyer's dissent in Knight v. Florida.
In that decision, he
pointed out that "this Court has long considered as relevant and informative the way in
which foreign courts have applied standards roughly comparable to our own
constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances."42 While acknowledging
35. See HC 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus. v. Minister of Fin., slip op. 27, 28-29 [2009] (lsr.).
36. Id. at 56, 73, 78, 81, 95, 105; Barak Medina, ConstitutionalLimits to Privatization: The Israeli Supreme
Court Decisionto Invalidate PrisonPrivatization,8 INTL J. CONST. L. 690, 691 (2010).
37. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus. v. Minister of Fin., slip op. 63-64 [2009] (lsr.).
38. Id. at 98.
39. AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 198 (2006). For a review of the challenges in norm-

creation and norm-consumption and their distribution, see Mark Toufayan, Identity, Effectiveness, and Newness
in Transjudicialism's Coming ofAge, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 329 (2010).
40. Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 21, at 1325.
41. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999).
42. Id. at 997.
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the decisions of the ECtHR, the Indian Supreme Court, and the Privy Council as nonbinding, he nevertheless considered "their views . . . useful." 43 This type of
"acknowledgement of society's concept of decency and human dignity" can also be
found in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of South Africa in its decision on
whether physical punishment, specifically whipping, was a permissible form of criminal
sentencing or whether it violated the standards of humanity. 44
While communicating at least in one direction, courts do not always cite another
court's jurisprudence in an approving manner. One example is the treatment of how to
implement decisions of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). In Medellin, the
majority of the Supreme Court held the decisions of the ICJ as non-binding and found
that international law does not require that states give direct effect to a decision of the
ICJ. 45 A few years prior, the German Constitutional Court held otherwise4 6 than its US
counterpart in a previous decision.47 The GCC distinguished the latter decision from its
own by acknowledging that while it too believed that the ICJ decision did not have direct
effect, the ICJ decision did require respectful consideration and provided a normative
guideline for the application and interpretation of international law.48 The approach of
the GCC could not have been more different from that of its U.S. counterpart, which
found that ICJ decisions were authoritative unless the German Constitution demanded
that a contrary solution be found.4 9 Therefore, it opted for a relationship that calls for an
intervention only in situations in which a decision of an international adjudicatory body
encroaches upon constitutional values. 5 0 Similar debates can be found in a dispute
concerning damages for crimes committed during World War II. In that decision, the
Italian Corte di Cassazione criticized the decision of its Greek sister court for relying on
the claim "that the violation of peremptory norms of international law," which concerned
"fundamental human rights," resulted in a denial of benefits regularly enjoyed by states
through sovereign immunity and "an implied waiver of sovereign immunity." 5 1 The
conversation however, did not end there, for the Italian court's decision itself was the
subject of severe criticism by the House of Lords dealing with state immunity for

43. Id. at 998.
44. State v. Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) at 13 para. 35 (S. Afr.). For a more thorough exploration of the
concept of human dignity in the South African context, see Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity as a
Constitutional Value, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 133, 139 (David
Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002).
45. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
46. See generally Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 19, 2006, 2
BvR 2115/01 (Ger.). See also Jana Gogolin, Avena and Sanchez-Llamas come to Germany-The German
ConstitutionalCourt Upholds Rights under the Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations, 8 GER. L.J. 261, 265
(2007).
47. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
48. Id. at para. 62.
49. See generally Carsten Hoppe, Implementation of LaGrand and Avena in Germany and the United
States: Exploring a Transatlantic Divide in Search of a Uniform Interpretationof Consular Rights, 18 EUR. J.
INTL L. 317 (2007).
50. Andreas Paulus, A Comparative Look at Domestic Enforcement of International Tribunal Judgments,
103 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 42, 45-46 (2009).
51. Andrea Bianchi, Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 243 (2005).
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torture. 52 The matter has resulted in a case before the ICJ, in which the ICJ rejected the
claim by Italy, upholding the principle of sovereign immunity.

B.

Open Communication Between Domestic Courts and InternationalCourts

Dialogue between international and domestic courts is yet another form of judicial
communication. Europe provides a rich field for exploration, regardless of whether one
considers the Court of Justice or the ECtH-R to be supranational/international institutions
or part of the constitutional framework. Moving slightly away from the example of
Medellin, the Supreme Court's decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon provides an
example of communication between a domestic and international court. 53 This dialogue
started ears before (consider the long history of the cases concerning LaGrand,54
Avena and Medellin 56) and culminated to this day with the Supreme Court's decision
in Sanchez-Llamas.57 As one observer comments, "In perhaps no other legal debate of
recent years have the battle lines been drawn more starkly than in the controversy over
U.S. courts' engagement in transnational judicial dialogue with foreign courts." 58
Having rejected the direct application of the ICJ judgments in Medellin or even allowing
for at least more than "respectful consideration," 59 Chief Justice Roberts made clear that
the relationship between the ICJ and the Supreme Court is not one of subordination by
the latter, but rather one in which the latter holds the upper hand in determining what
effect a ruling of the ICJ may have as a matter of federal law. 60 It is only logical then
that the Supreme Court found the procedural default rule did give "full effect" to Article
36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.61 In the following passages,

52. See generally Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26 (appeal taken from Eng.).
53. See generally Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
54. See generally LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3). For the U.S.
Supreme Court's response to the indication of provisional measures, see generally Germany v. United States,
526 U.S. 111 (1999). For the ICJ's judgment, see generally LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 1.C.J. 466
(June 27); Bruno Simma & Carsten Hoppe, From LaGrand and Avena to Medellin-A Rocky Road Toward
Implementation, 14 TULSA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7 (2005).
55. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Request for Interpretation of the Judgment, 2009
1.C.J. 3 (Jan. 19).
56. For the order indicating provisional measure, see generally Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex.
v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 2003 I.C.J. 77 (Feb. 5). For the judgment, see generally Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31), and Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Request for Interpretation of the Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 3 (Jan. 19). Mexico sought
clarification of the judgment subsequent to the execution of a number of Mexican nationals. See generally
Laurence Dubin, Les Garanties de Non-Rdpitition al aune des Affaires LaGrand et Avena, 109 REVUE
GENERALE DE DROIT INT'L PUB. 859 (2005); Malvina Halberstam, LaGrand and Avena Establish a Right, But
is there a Remedy?Brief Comments on the Legal Effect of LaGrand and Avena in the U.S., II ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 415 (2005); Hoppe, supra note 51. For the US Supreme Court's response, see Medellin v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 499 (2008). For a more positive view for future cases due to the litigation in Medellin, see Janet
Koven Levit, Does Medellin Matter?, 77 FORDHAM LAw L. REv. 617, 618 (2008).
57. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331.
58. Melissa Waters, Treaty Dialogue in Sanchez-Llamas: Is ChiefJustice Roberts a Transnationalist,After
All?, 11 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 89, 89 (2007).
59. Sanchez-Llamas,548 U.S. at355.
60. Id. at 355-56.
61. Id. at 334.
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Roberts provides an explanation for his finding in that "procedural default rules
generally take on greater importance in an adversary system such as ours" and contrasts
the U.S. system from that of civil law countries where failure to raise a claim can
potentially be remedied. 62
Some have considered this opinion as a form of dialogue in which both sides tried
to educate the other.63 It is true that dialogue in its ideal form is not uni-directional, but
instead should be a two-way communication. In a perfect situation, there would be true
dialogue where courts would respond to one another's decisions in what one
commentator calls a "co-constitutive process of norm development."64 However, this is
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.65 When human lives are at stake, as was the case
in Sanchez-Llamas, one envisions a different approach to giving "full effect" to the
obligations into which the United States has entered. 66 Furthermore, the underlying tone
in the majority opinion in Sanchez-Llamas is indicative much less of a genuine
willingness to engage in productive dialogue, but rather a perception that the ICJ is not
fully aware of the applicable rules in the United States.
The exchange between the ICJ and the Supreme Court of Israel following the
building of the Israeli separation barrier is another example of communication between
an international court and a domestic court. 67 The decisions centered on the creation of a
separation barrier, which was constructed to decrease the rising number of terrorist
attacks on Israeli citizens.68 Its route partially tracks the 1949 Armistice Line, but also,
in certain sections, extends into Palestinian territory.69
The Supreme Court's first decision on the separation barrier, Beit Sourik,70 came
62. Id. at 357.
63. Waters, supranote 58, at 96.
64. Waters, supranote 2, at 497.
65. See Gelter & Siems, Networks, Dialogue or One-Way Traffic? An Empirical Analysis of CrossCitations between Ten European Supreme Courts, supranote 24, at 17; Lambert, supra note 25, at 519-20. One
situation in which this may have worked is the ongoing communication between the European Court of Justice
(at the time) and the German Constitutional Court over the protection of individual liberties within the
European framework. Note, however, that this type of dialogue is mandated by the close integration of national
legal systems into the European Union. See also Benvenisti, supra note 24, at 251.
66. See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 382 (Breyer, J. dissenting). Note that Breyer's dissent provided an
interpretation in which "full effect" would have been given to the requirements of Article 36 the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).
67. Because there is no shortage of commentary on this issue, see Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H.
Oxman, Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory:
Editor's Introduction, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2005); David Kretzmer, Introduction: Domestic and
InternationalJudicialReview of the Construction of the Separation Barrier, 38 ISR. L. REV. 6, 8 (2005); see
also Aeyal M. Gross, The Construction of a Wall between The Hague and Jerusalem: The Enforcement and
Limits of HumanitarianLaw and the Structure of Occupation, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 393, 394 (2006); Yuval
Shany, Head Against the Wall? Israel's Rejection of the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequence of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 7 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 352, 352

(2004).
68. Daphne Barak-Erez, Israel: The Security Barrier- Between InternationalLaw, ConstitutionalLaw, and
Domestic Judicial Revieiv, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 540, 544, 547 (2006); Israel's Security Fence: Execution
Aspects, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, http://www.seamzone.mod.gov.il/pages/eng/execution.htm.

69. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, Special Focus
Report, Seven years after the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Barrier: The Impact
of
the
Barrier
in
the
Jerusalem
Area
(July
2011),
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha opt barrier updateJuly_2011_english.pdf.
70. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr. 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.), available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files eng/04/560/020/A28/04020560.a28.pdf
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down on June 30, 2004. Using a proportionality test, which itself was the result of
comparative inquiry, the Court invalidated part of the barrier around the village of Beit
Sourik based on the disproportionate impact the particular routing of the wall had on the
livelihood of the Palestinian population. The Court did not directly address the question
of the legality of the barrier, as it was considered to be a temporary security measure.71
Less than two weeks later, the ICJ rendered its advisory opinion, declaring that the parts
of the wall that were on Palestinian territory were incompatible with international law.
While not directly addressing the question of whether the barrier constituted annexation,
the ICJ did point out that the route of the wall created a fait accompli, which could
become permanent.72 The ICJ addressed the question of self-defense without discussing
the fact that self-defense under the UNC is a measure addressed against states and,
despite the Security Council resolutions to the contrary, Israel could not invoke this type
of self-defense because it was the occupying power. 73 Thus the ICJ arrived at the
following conclusions: comply with humanitarian law and the principle of selfdetermination; stop construction and dismantle existing elements on Palestinian territory;
and return property or provide compensation for damages suffered. 74
The Supreme Court had a chance to respond to the ICJ advisory opinion a little
over a year later in Mara'abev. The Prime Minister of Israel.75 It stated that the advisory
opinion was to be given "full appropriate weight." 76 This is in marked contrast to the
wording of the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Israel ultimately found that the ICJ's decision was
based on different facts than those in the case before it. The Supreme Court of Israel's
treatment of the ICJ advisory opinion in Mara'abe is extensive, covering almost 1/3 of
the 66 pages of the decision. Most importantly, the differences regarding the factual basis
concerned the security rationales for erecting the barrier, which the ICJ barely touched
upon. 79 Similar to Beit Sourik, the Court found parts of the barrier had to be re-routed
based on a proportionality test. 80 The tone of the decision is one of bewilderment. Given
that both courts apply the same legal rules to the same situation, how was it that the two
courts came to such diametrically opposed conclusions?
Both the ICJ and the Israeli Supreme Court have had the chance to interact with
one another. However, this interaction also serves as an example of the potential

71. Id. at paras. 28-29, 32.
72. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 184 (July 9).
73. Id. at 194.
74. Id. at 197-98.
75. HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477 [2005] (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/04/570/079/al4/04079570.al4.htm.
76. Id. at para. 56.
77. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U. S. 331, 352-57 (2006). In this decision, the Supreme Court did not
give weight to the ICJ's decisions in LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 1.C.J. 466 (June 27) and Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mlex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
78. HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477, paras. 59-62 [2005] (lsr.), available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/fileseng/04/570/079/al4/04079570.al4.htm.
79. Id. at paras. 66-72. Another reason for the factual differences was the ability of the court proceedings to
respond to the different allegations made by either side, something the ICJ had not been able to do.
80. Id. at paras. 72-73.
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shortcomings of transnational legal communication. The ICJ's perspective, partially
brought about by it rendering an advisory opinion without full participation on the part of
Israel, led it to avoid addressing an essential part of the equation. The ICJ only dealt in a
cursory fashion with the security dimension of the wall and failed to at least take Israel's
arguments seriously in that respect. A criticism that may be directed at the Supreme
Court of Israel is that throughout both decisions it maintained the barrier should be
considered a temporary measure and did not link it to the larger question of the legality
of the settlements in the West Bank. 82 Another criticism has been raised over what one
author conceives of as the "artificial separations between security and politics, between
authority and proportionality." 83 Constrained by these processes as well as their internal
procedure,84 the two courts were precluded from having a true exchange of ideas.
Moreover, being presented with the question of the legality of the construction as a
whole, the ICJ was in the unenviable position to make pronouncements without being
afforded the ability to inspect particular sections of the barrier - which consists of
fences in the large majority of its extent and concrete barriers in small but important and
easily visible sections - in detail (or having the capacity to compel countries to submit
information).85 Beit Sourik, on the other hand, concerned only a small section of the
barrier in a particular location. Talking at one another rather than engaging in a true
dialogue, the decisions ultimately serve as an example of communication between
judicial institutions, though one with serious deficiencies. Such deficiencies are
prevalent, though not insurmountable obstacles, in communications between
international and domestic institutions (outside of settings in which such communication
is mandated by design, such as in the case of the ECtHR86 or the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights) where most decisions are singular in nature, setting aside disputes
concerning recurring themes such as the Article 36 VCCR challenges before the ICJ
against the United States and the zeroing disputes before the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.

C.

Dialogue Between Courts and other Institutions

Another type of transnational judicial dialogue may take place when one
participant of the discourse is situated outside of the realm of the judiciary. While this

81. At least one of the justices indicates it was the ICJ's choice to not engage in such a discussion. See
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. 136, 211-212 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
82. Yuval Shany, Capacities and Inadequacies: A Look at the Two Separation Barrier Cases, 38 ISR. L.
REV. 230, 242-44 (2005). Yuval Shany calls this the "Elephant in the Room." Id
83. Gross, supranote 67, at 396.
84. Damrosch & Oxman, supra note 67, at 1.
85. This is why, according to Judge Buergenthal, the ICJ should have declined to answer the request for an
advisory opinion. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 1.C.J. 136, 245 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal).
86. For a study concerning the reputational costs and benefits of the judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights, see Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L.
115 (2011).
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type of communication was not contained in the original conception of transjudicial
communication, important debates are not confined to the judiciary. Oftentimes, a
discourse in other spheres of international relations reverts back to judicial decisions,
whether reached by international adjudicatory bodies or domestic courts.
President Barak was involved in a dialogue with institutions outside the judiciary
during a decision rendered at the very end of his tenure on the Supreme Court in
December 2006. The Court dealt with the issue of whether the policy of targeted
88
killings was permissible. At the time, the State employed a policy of preemptive strikes
against individuals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a means of preventing
terrorist attacks that would kill and injure Israeli civilians. However, because of the
nature of the strikes and the location of the targeted individuals, the IDF's strikes - in
certain circumstances - harmed innocent civilians. The Court's opinion, written by
President Barak, stressed the importance of the state staying within the bounds of the law
in its struggle against terrorism. 8 "The war against terrorism is also law's war against
those who rise up against it." 9 0 The decision noted that in combating terrorism, the
success of the democratic state is only possible through the adherence to the rule of
law.91 The Supreme Court found that the conflict "between Israel and the terrorist
organizations in the area" was one of an international character. 92 Because of this, the
Court decided that terrorists were permissible targets only as long as they were directly
taking part in hostilities. 93 The Court did not make a blanket determination of the
permissibility of the strikes, but instead imposed various limitations on the policy of
targeted killings, including minimizing the impact on civilians, proportionality
requirements, as well as mechanisms of ex post facto review.94 More important than the
individual findings of the Supreme Court, however, for present purposes, was the wider
impact of this decision. It was not only debated within Israel and in the realm of
academics interested in international humanitarian law, but it also occupied considerable
space in the report submitted by Philip Alston, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary, or arbitrary executions. 9 5
The major point of criticism voiced by the Special Rapporteur, without directly
taking aim at the Supreme Court of Israel, is how to classify a particular situation and,
therefore, which set or sets of rules should apply. By labeling the conflict as one of an

87. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. [2006] (lsr.), available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Id. at para. 62.
90. Id. at para. 62. (quoting HCJ 3451/02 Almandi v. Minister of Def. 56(3) PD 30, 34 [2002] (Isr.)).
91. Id. at para. 62.
92. Id. at para. 21. For a different view, holding that both human rights law as well as international
humanitarian law applies, see David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial
Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171 (2005).
93. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr., slip op. paras. 31-40 [2006] (Isr.),
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.
94. Id. at paras. 61-64.
95. U.N. Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions,
6-7,
U.N.
Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6
(May
28,
2010),
available
at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC. 14.24.Add6.pdf.
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international character,96 the report argues the Court can take advantage of the
provisions pertaining to conflicts of an international character, which "arguably [have]
more permissive rules for killing than does human rights law or a State's domestic law
and generally provide immunity to State armed forces." 97 Because of the lower degree of
procedural safeguards within international humanitarian law, the "potential for abuse" is
higher. 9 8 This criticism is applicable in the context of legal systems in which the
executive power enjoys unfettered discretion and does not have to face judicial
intervention. However, this is not the situation in the case of the use of force by the
Israeli military.99 Rejecting the political question doctrine in Mara'abe,100 the Supreme
Court decided it would not be deterred from rendering a decision in areas that had
previously been considered to fall under the sole purview of the political branches. 101
President Barak's view that political issues do not fall outside the realm of judicial
intervention is central to his larger jurisprudential framework that the role of a judge in a
democracy is the "protect[ion of] the constitution and [of] democracy.',102 This concept
becomes concrete when the Court finds that "[t]he petition before us is intended to
determine the permissible and the forbidden in combat which might harm the most basic
right of a human being - the right to life. The doctrine of institutional non-justiciability
cannot prevent the examination of that question."1 03
President Barak stated - contrary to Cicero 104 - that "when the cannons roar that

96. Id. at 6-7, 16. The decision of the Supreme Court of Israel classified the conflict of being of an
international character because the military operation took place outside of its border, contradicting the
requirements of international humanitarian law ("IHL") that generally posits that the identity of the parties
determine the applicable regime.
97. Id. at 16.
98. Id.
99. There is a powerful critique that the position of the Supreme Court, including under Barak's leadership,
to not interfere into the domain of the other branches of government underwent only a slow change. For a
criticism with respect to the Palestinian territories, see DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE:
THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 127-35 (2002). Similar criticism has
been raised with respect to the question over whether Yeshiva students should be exempt from the military. For
the longest time, the court refused to hear the petitions because of the political nature of the dispute. See
Amnon Straschnov, The JudicialSystem in Israel, 34 TULSA L.J. 527, 534 (1999). It was not until 1998 that
the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, found the practice, based on a political compromise
since the creation of the state of Israel, to be unconstitutional. The court declared that such a decision should
not be taken by administrative regulation, but rather gave the Knesset one year to remedy the situation by
enacting a law, mandating it to provide justifications for any exemption to be granted. Again, there is a strong
component of comparative law in this judgment. See HC 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Def 52(5) PD 481
[1998] (Isr.) available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/97/670/032/All /97032670.all.pdf In 2002, the
Knesset passed a law that continued the exemption of Yeshiva students from military service. Joel Greenberg,
Orthodox Torah Students
Win Israeli Draft Exemption, N.Y.TIMES,
July
24, 2002,
www.nytimes.com/2002/07/24/world/orthodox-torah-students-win-israeli-draft-exemption.html.
100. HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477, paras. 14, 31 [2005] (Isr.), available
at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/04/570/079/al4/04079570.al4.htm.
101. Id. at para. 31. This was not the first decision in which the Supreme Court had decided questions with
political ramifications. See HCJ 390/70 Duikat v. Gov't of Isr. 34(1) PD 1, 15 [1979] (Isr.). For a comparative
as well as an interemporal perspective on this question, see Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 3.
102. Aharon Barak, The Role ofA Supreme Court in A Democracy, and the FightAgainst Terrorism, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 125, 126 (2003).
103. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr., slip op. para. 50 [2006] (Isr.),
available athttp://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.
104. "Silent enim leges inter arma," meaning "for laws are silent amid arms," in M.T. CICERONIS, ORATIO
PRO TITO ANNIO MILONE 4, 43 (John Smyth Purton trans., 1886).
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we especially need the laws." 105 Moreover, the decision made clear that "black holes" 106
do not exist in the law. In all forms of military conflict, a careful balancing must take
place between the civilian damage on one hand and the military advantage on the
other. 107 This balancing act is explained in greater detail, although in considerable
abstraction, leaving the decision to the military commander in a particular situation. The
Supreme Court stated that
[A] balance is needed between security needs and individual rights.
That balancing casts a heavy load upon those whose job is to provide
security. Not every efficient means is also legal. The ends do not
justify the means. The army must instruct itself according to the rules
of the law. That balancing casts a heavy load upon the judges, who
must determine - according to the existing law - what is permitted,
and what forbidden. 108
Crucially, the decision left considerable discretion to the military commander in
determining the permissibility of a particular attack. In this way, the decision is
structurally similar to those in the separation barrier cases, in which the Supreme Court
also left the discretion as to where best to build the barrier to the military - safe for
extraordinary circumstances. 109 This particular aspect has led to considerable criticism
of the decision. 110 While part of this criticism is not unjustified, it is important to keep in
mind the institutional settings and the societal realities in which courts in general - and
this court in particularI - find themselves in, and the larger implications court rulings
can have, i.e., in this case, the insistence on relying on the principle of proportionality,
while at the same time recognizing that "special weight" must be given to the "military
opinion of the official who is responsible for security.',1l2 While the court may
105. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr., slip op. para. 61 [2006] (sr.),
available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf;
see also Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 98, at 19-20.
106. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr., slip op. para. 61 [2006] (Isr.) (citing
JOHAN STEYN, DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW: SELECTED SPEECHES AND JUDGMENTS 195 (2004)),
available athttp://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.
107. Id. at para. 60.
108. Id. at para. 63. For a previous finding, echoing the same sentiment, see HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. Military
Commander of the Judea & Samaria Area 56(6) PD 352, 358 [2002] (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/02/150/070/A15/02070150.al5.pdf.
109. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr. 58(5) PD 807, paras. 36, 46 [2004] (Isr.),
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files eng/04/560/020/A28/04020560.a28.pdf.
110. Nir Keidar, An Examination of the Authority of the Military Commander to Requisition Privately
OivnedLandfor the Constructionof the SeparationBarrier,38 ISR. L. REv. 247, 255-56 (2005); Shany, supra
note 67, at 368.
111. This notion was expressed in the Beit Sourik case, when the Court found:
We are members of Israeli society. Although we are sometimes in an ivory tower, that
tower is in the heart of Jerusalem, which is not infrequently hit by ruthless terrorism. We
are aware of the killing and destruction wrought by the terrorism against the State and its
citizens. As any other Israelis, we too recognize the need to defend the country and its
citizens against terrorism's severe blow.
HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr. 58(5) PD 807, para. 63 [2004] (Isr.) (quoting HCJ
2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr. 58(5) PD 807, 861 46 [2004] (Isr.)), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/04/560/020/A28/04020560.a28.pdf; see also Daphne Barak-Erez, The
InternationalLaw of Human Rights and ConstitutionalLaw: A Case Study of an Expanding Dialogue, 2 INTL
J. CONST. L. 611, 613 (2004).
112. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr. 58(5) PD 807, para. 47 [2004] (Isr.), available at
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ultimately leave the individual decision in the hands of the military commander in the
case at hand and in the hands of the executive in more general terms, it nevertheless
sends an important signal in that it will retain a watchful eye on the actions of the other
branches of government. This is arguably where the lasting impact and legacy of the
tenure of President Barak may lie, i.e., in the fact that the entire realm of governmental
action - be it executive or legislative' 13 - is subject to review by the courts.

D.

Semi-Open Dialogue

There are other forms of judicial dialogue outside of reasoned opinions, such as
judicial conferences in which judges, policymakers, and scholars exchange their
ideas. 114 Some of these groups are convened on an official basis, mostly by international
organizations. Two examples include the Judicial Reference Group, as well as the
Organization of Supreme Courts of the Americas. The former is a network for fostering
dialogue among judges from different jurisdictions under the aegis of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees.115 The latter was initially convened by the Organization of
American States, though its current status is not wholly clear.116 Other groups are purely
private, i.e., associations of individuals who are judges and convene in order to exchange
information without official governmental direction to do so. One of the best examples is
the International Association of Refugee Law Judges. The raison d'tre of this private
association, membership to which is only open to judges or quasi-judicial decisionmakers, has been described by one of its officers as providing the forum for coordination
of how best to interpret the obligations contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention. 117
Because it operates outside the bounds of government hierarchies and yet provides a
point of information sharing, members consider it highly useful and a viable alternative
to official, and often highly formalized modes of information exchange. Other examples
include the Commonwealth Magistrates' and Judges' Association,118 as well as the
International Association of Judges. 119 Finally, there are academic institutions which
foster not only discourse among judges but also between judges and academia, e.g. the
annual meeting of constitutional court justices at Yale Law School. 120
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/04/560/020/A28/04020560.a28.pdf.
113. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD 221, para. 1 [1995] (Isr.),
available atlhttp://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/93/210/068/zOl/93068210.z01.pdf
114. Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 21, at 1329-30.
115. Kirby, supranote 3, at 176-79.
116. The original charter is contained in Charterof the Organizationof Supreme Courts of the Americas, 40
ST. Louis U. L.J. 1131 (1996); see also Supportfor the Administration of Justice in the Americas, Dept. of
Intl
Legal
Affairs,
AG/RES.
1407
(XXVI-0/96)
(June
7,
1996),
available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga-res96/Res-1407.htm; Fernando Carrillo Florez, Supreme Courts Of The
Americas Organization: Judicial Independence And Its Relationship With The Legislative Bodies, 42 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1033, 1043 (1998).
117. Hugo Storey, The Advanced Refugee Law Workshop Experience: An IARLJ Perspective, 15 INT L J.
REFUGEE L. 422, 422 (2003).
118. About the CMJA,
COMMONWEALTH
MAGISTRATES'
AND
JUDGES'
ASSOCIATION,
http://www.cmja.org/about.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
119. INT'L Ass'N OF JUDGES, http://www.iai-uim.org/site/index.php?lang-en (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
120. InternationalSupreme Courtand ConstitutionalJustices Meet at Yale Law School, YALE L. SCHOOL

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol47/iss2/9

16

Wagner: Transnational Legal Communication: A Partial Legacy of Supreme Co
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL COMMUNICATION

2011

453

Moreover, there is increasing transnational legal communication among courts
through official visits or exchanges among courts.121 For example, the GCC frequently
provides press releases when delegations from other courts visit or when GCC judges
themselves visit courts abroad. The same is true, for example, for the frequent visits that
are reported by the ECtHR. 122

E.

Non-Open Dialogue

Finally, there are forms of transnational legal communication that take place
outside of the public limelight. By their very nature, they are harder to track and rely on
anecdotal evidence by judges.123 Several judges themselves have described this type of
dialogue as taking place through personal meetings,124 by email, or through other means

of communication.125 Through the means described above, some judges develop
personal relationships with one another, which may indirectly influence each other's way
of thinking. As Judge Kirby says, "there will be a meeting of minds between these highly
influential intellectual leaders of their nations.',126 Whether this has a direct impact on a
particular judgment is hard to determine. It is, however, submitted that the qualifications
for judges of the highest order, while not making them immune to undue influences,
serve as a bar to merely regurgitating ideas that may have developed elsewhere and
communicated in private. Instead, as President Barak has noted, judges are influenced
through a variety of sources, and it is imperative that there be a determination of
"whether there is anything in the historical development and social conditions that makes
the local and the foreign system different enough to render interpretative inspiration
impracticable." 12 7 As pointed out by President Barak, the value in considering
comparative law is that it "brings about understanding of the text, not alteration to it" and
"provides understanding of national law," rather than wholesale introduction of foreign
law into the domestic system.128 Daphne Barak-Erez echoed this sentiment by saying

(Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.law.yale.edu/news/12333.htm. Most of the sessions that take place in the context
of this particular meeting are closed and confidential to create an atmosphere where individual views can be
freely exchanged.
121. Presentation Of The Network, NETWORK OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE SUPREME JUD. COURTS OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION, http://www.rpcsjue.org/page/network (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
122. For two examples, see Meetings and Official Visits 2012, EUROPEAN CT. OF HuM. RTS.,
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+President/Events/The President Events.htm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2012), as well as InternationalRelations, THE CONST. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,
http://www.usud.hr/default.aspx?Show=c medjunarodna suradnja&ml=24&m2=0&Lang=en
(last visited
Sept. 20, 2011).
123. Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her Court,and Vice Versa, N.Y.
TIMES, April 12, 2009, at A14.
124. See Michael Kirby, Dialogue: Think Globally, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 287, 291-92 (2001).
125. Claire L'Heureux-Dub , The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of
the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 17 (1998).
126. Kirby, supra note 124, at 292.
127. Aharon Barak, Chief Justice of Isr., Remarks at The Fulbright Convention: Comparative Law,
Originalism and the Role of a Judge in a Democracy: A Reply to Justice Scalia (January 29, 2006) (on file with
author).
128. Id. at 13-14.
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that "learning from other legal systems has always been a major technique in the
development of the law." 1 29 And unlike others, President Barak's judicial philosophy
would not boil down to an image of a judge as a legal automaton, or in the words of
Chief Justice Roberts1 30 and Justice Sotomayor, 13 1 a judge who merely calls "balls and
strikes."
In a rebuke to the concept of originalism, as well as the idea of deciding legal
questions in a formalistic manner, President Barak wrote concerning the proper role of
judges in a democracy:
The intent of the constitutional authors, however, exists alongside the
fundamental views and values of modern society at the time of
interpretation. The constitution is intended to solve the problems of the
contemporary person, to protect his or her freedom. It must contend
with his or her needs. Therefore, in determining the constitution's
purpose through interpretation, one must also take into account the
values and principles that prevail at the time of interpretation, seeking
synthesis and harmony between past intention and present principle. 132

F.

Academic Teaching and Scholarship

Another element excluded, for good reason, from the original conception of
transnational judicial dialogue was the role that judges play outside of the courtroom.
Judges routinely hold positions at academic institutions before, during, and after their
time on the bench. Whether through teaching or writing, these positions extend the
judge's impact out of the judicial and into the academic realm. A discussion of President
Barak's legacy is not complete without recognizing his role as a teacher and an
academic. President Barak has taught at numerous institutions while sitting on the bench,
including, but not limited to, Harvard University, the University of Michigan, the
University of Toronto, and Yale University. He has continued in this role to this day,
teaching at various institutions outside of Israel in addition to his responsibilities at the
Faculty of Law at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya. Through his teaching,
President Barak exerted and continues to exert immeasurable influence over an audience
comprised of the next generation of lawyers, judges, and legal scholars.
His academic impact extends beyond the classroom to his legal scholarship.
Regarded as one of the most astute thinkers on judicial propriety and the protection of

129. Daphne Barak-Erez, The Institutional Aspects of Comparative Law, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 477, 478
(2009).
130. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be ChiefJustice of the United
States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of Chief Justice John
Roberts), availableathttp://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/shl09-158/55-56.pdf.
131. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 78, 137
(2009)
(statements
of Sen.
Herb
Kohl
and
Sen.
Lindsey
Graham),
available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/shl 11-503/62-151 .pdf
132. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116
HARV. L. REV. 16, 69 (2002).
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individuals from state action, he has authored books and articles on subjects as diverse as
human rights, the impact of the American Constitution, and the Uniform Commercial
Code. 133 A notable and recurring focus of Barak's writings, however, is the role of the
court in protecting democracy. 134 Additionally, two of his most influential books outside
of Israel, Purposive Interpretationl35 and The Judge in a Democracy,136 have been
translated into English and are the sources of academic and popular writing. President
Barak is - to date - the only author of the foreword to the Harvard Law Review's
annual review of the US Supreme Court's jurisprudence who was at the time a sitting
judge of a foreign court.137

G.

The Use of ComparativeLaw as a Communications Device with Foreign and
InternationalCounterparts

Most of these modes of transnational legal communication are part of a narrative
that centers around the judicial function per se. In many ways, the decisions rendered
could be seen just as that - legal decisions with application to a particular case or a
particular legal question around which numerous cases arise. The decisions surrounding
the barrier/wall/fence may be a case in point. The decisions concerning the separation
barrier commanded the attention not only of legal circles but also of the political realm.
In the context of the High Court of Justice's first decision, Beit Sourik,138 the Court, and
particularly President Barak because of their stature, was regarded as having an
ambassadorial function. 139
An additional type of "communication" that has not been addressed so far, but
which has had far-reaching consequences, is the use of comparative law in the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. This has manifested itself not only with respect to
the adoption of solutions that have been found in other legal systems when deciding
concrete cases, but also with respect to the use of legal doctrines that may help to further
develop a more meaningful version of democratic rule and that may permeate a legal
system as such. 140 The most well known of such use of comparative law may be the
133. See Aharon Barak, Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper- An Outsider's Viev, Part 1, 3
ISR. L. REV. 7 (1968); Aharon Barak, The Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper: An Outsider's
View, Part II, 3 ISR. L. REV. 184 (1968); Aharon Barak, Freedom of Speech in Israel: The Impact of the
American Constitution, 8 TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 241 (1988); Aharon Barak, Human Rights in Israel,39 ISR.
L. REV. 12 (2006).

134. See Barak, supra note 132, at 149. Discussing the importance of judicial protection of democracy in
general, and of human rights in particular, see Barak, supra note 102, at 125-26, 133-34.
135. AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (Sari Bashi trans., 2005).
136. BARAK, supranote 39.

137. Indeed, it appears that while some authors of the foreword were born outside of the US (e.g. Gerald
Gunther and Louis Henkin), all of them or certainly the large majority of them held US citizenship.
138. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr. 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (lsr.), available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files eng/04/560/020/A28/04020560.a28.pdf.
139. See Hassan Jabareen, Ignoring the 'Other', 14 ADALAH'S NEWSL. 1, 1-4 (2005) (reviewing AHARON
BARAK, SHOFET BEHEVRA DEMOKRATIT (A JUDGE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY) 2005).

140. Barak himself uses a similar conception, calling these two modes of comparison "microcomparison"
and "macrocomparison," respectively, and remains cognizant of the need to compare legal systems that share at
least a core of social and historical circumstances. See BARAK, supra note 39, at 197-200.
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adoption of judicial review, as outlined below. Another example of the use of
comparative law that had more far-reaching consequences is the adoption of the principle
of proportionality on a much wider scale than before. 141
Much more than other countries, Israel was characterized by not having a written
constitutional design. At the time of the founding of Israel, there had been plans to create
a written constitution by the beginning of October 1948,142 but that written constitution
as such never materialized. Constitutional principles thus had to be created without a
written document to base it on. As President Barak put it, Israel has had to develop
"constitutional law . . . without a . . . constitution."

14 3

Since 1958, the Knesset passed

Basic Laws on the structure of the state and its institutions, 144 but until 1992, the country
lacked a constitution-type document relating to personal freedoms. At that time, it
adopted a Basic Law that guaranteed human dignity and freedom, albeit with few details
and very general language.1 4 5 Importantly, however, both documents contained
limitation clauses, i.e. one of the cornerstones of modern constitutionalism.
It was not until 1995 in the Court's famous Bank Mizrahi decision that judicial
review was firmly established in Israel.146 In that opinion, which oftentimes has been
compared to Marbury v. Madison1 47 and is considered by many as one of the most
important comparative constitutional law decisions, 148 the Court held that because of the
141. For an extensive treatment of the subject, see id. at 254; see also AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (Doron Kalir trans., 2012). The principle was first

expounded upon in its current form in CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD
221 passim [1995] (Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/fileseng/93/210/068/zO/93068210.z01.pdf.
For a comparative perspective, see Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, ProportionalityBalancingand Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 72 (2008).

142. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 3, 4 (1948) (Isr.).
143. Aharon Barak, ConstitutionalLaw Without a Constitution: The Role of the Judiciary, in THE ROLE OF
COURTS IN SOCIETY 448 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1988); Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written
Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 309 (1995);
Menachem Hofnung, The Unintended Consequences of Unplanned Constitutional Reform: Constitutional
Politics in Israel, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 588-92 (1996). But see the comments by Posner, remarking that
"Israel is an immature democracy, poorly governed; its political class is mediocre and corrupt; it floats
precariously in a lethally hostile Muslim sea; and it really could use a constitution" in Richard Posner,
Enlightened Despot, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 23, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/enlighteneddespot. For a reply, see Barak Medina, Four Myths of Judicial Review: A Response to Richard Posner's
Critique ofAharon Barak's JudicialActivism, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 1 (Aug. 16, 2007).
144. Basic Law: The Knesset, 5718-1958, S.H. No. 244 p. 69 (Isr.); Basic Law: Israel Lands, 5720-1960,
S.H. No. 312 p. 56 (Isr.); Basic Law: The President of the State, 5724-1964, S.H. No. 428 p. 118 (Isr.); Basic
Law: The Government, 5761-2001, S.H. No. 1780 p. 158 (Isr.); Basic Law: The State Economy, 5735-1975,
S.H. No. 777 p. 206 (Isr.); Basic Law: The Military, 5736-1976, S.H. No. 806 p. 154 (Isr.); Basic Law:
Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 5740-1980, S.H. No. 980 p. 186 (Isr.); Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5744-1984, S.H.
No. 11 10 p. 78 (Isr.); Basic Law: The State Comptroller, S.H. 5748 p. 30 (Isr.). The Basic Law concerning
"The Government" was replaced twice.
145. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, S.H. No. 1391 (Isr.); Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, 5754-1994, S.H. No. 1454 p 90 (Lsr.).
146. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD 221 passim [1995] (Isr.),
available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/fileseng/93/210/068/zOl/93068210.zO.pdf. For a different view,
holding that judicial review was already established in the 1960s, see Rivka Weill, Reconciling Parliamentary
Sovereignty andJudicial Review: On the Theoreticaland HistoricalOrigins of the Legislative Override Power,
39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457 (2012); Patricia J. Woods, The Ideational Foundations of Israel's
"Constitutional Revolution," 62 POL. RES. Q. 811, 811 (2009).
147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
148. See, e.g., Yoram Rabin & Arnon Gutfeld, Marbury v. Madison and Its Impact on Israeli Constitutional
Law, 15 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 318-22 (2007); Zeev Segal, The Israeli Constitutional

Revolution: The CanadianImpact in the Midst ofa Formative Period,8 CONST. F. 53, 55 (1997); Ran Hirschl,
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Knesset's function as a constitutional assembly when passing the Basic Law pertaining
to human dignity and freedom, all other laws would from then on be measured against
this standard. 14 9 In the interpretation of what it meant to be a Jewish and a democratic
state, guidance could be gleaned from the Declaration of Independence, as well as what
Justice Barak (at the time) called a background-understanding model. 150 The Bank
151
Mizrahi decision was important for a number of reasons.
Acting without a formal
constitution (in important ways similar to the constitutional design of the UK), Israel's
system had previously been characterized by parliamentary sovereignty and not - as the
decision logically requires - by the supremacy of some kind of constitutional
arrangement. This meant that a Basic Law could only be changed by another Basic
Law.152 Complicating things, the Knesset passes Basic Laws without any requirement
that supersedes those for other legislative acts. Rather than imposing a supermajority,
Basic Laws can be passed and have been passed with simple majorities. While Basic
Laws thus have no special procedural requirements and one could thus argue they should
not enjoy special status,153 the term "constitutional revolution" has been used by many
to describe the development that followed the passage of the two Basic Laws pertaining
to the protection of the rights of individuals. 154 Importantly, these two Basic Laws
contained language that prohibited infringement upon the basic rights contained in them,
unless four cumulative conditions were met. The limitations would have to (1) be
prescribed by law, (2) be compatible with Israel's basic values as a Jewish and a
democratic State, (3) promote a worthy purpose, and (4) prevent the introduction of
excessive restrictions. 155
The importance of the decision was summed up by President Barak himself when
he summarized the elements that transformed the constitutional system of Israel:
[W]e became a constitutional democracy. We joined the democratic,
enlightened nations in which human rights are awarded a constitutional
Note, Israel's 'Constitutional Revolution': The Legal Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties in an
Emerging Neo-LiberalEconomic Order,46 AM. J. COMp. L. 427, 447 (1998). The decision contributed greatly
to and put the Israeli Supreme Court at the center of the debate about the propriety of judicial review. See
ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 111-34 (2003). See generally
Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS, 153-67 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984); Jeremy
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against JudicialReview, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
149. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.) (opinion of
President A. Barak), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/93/210/068/zOl/93068210.zOl.pdf.
150. Barak, supranote 143, at 451-52.
151. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.), available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files eng/93/210/068/zOl/93068210.zOl.pdf.
152. See, e.g., Basic Law: Human Dignity and I iberty, 5752-1992, S.H. No. 1391 para. 12 (Isr.); Basic Iaw:
Freedom of Occupation, 5754-1994, S.H. No. 1454 p. 90 para. 5 (Isr.); CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd.
available at
PD
221,
para.
8
[1995]
(Isr.),
v.
Migdal
Coop.
Vill.
49(4)
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files eng/93/210/068/zOl/93068210.zOl.pdf.
153. See for this and a general critique, Ruth Gavison, A ConstitutionalRevolution?, in TOWARDS A NEW
EUROPEAN IUS COMMUNE: ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN, ITALIAN AND ISRAELI LAW, IN OCCASION OF 50 YEARS OF

THE E.U. AND OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 517, 517-26 (A. Gambaro & A.M. Rabello eds., 1999).

154. The term is used by Aharon Barak himself, but also by others. See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank
Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD 221, paras.
1-4 [1995]
(Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/93/210/068/zOl/93068210.zOl.pdf; see also Yoram Rabin & Yuval Shany,
The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional Revolution: Has the Time Come for Protecting Economic and Social
Rights?, 37 ISR. L. REV. 299, 300 (2003-04).
155. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992. S.H. No. 1391 para. 8 (Isr.).
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force, above the regular statutes. Similar to the United States, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan and other western countries, we now
have a constitutional defense for Human Rights. We too have the
central chapter in any written constitution, the subject-matter of which
is Human Rights; we too have restrictions on the legislative power of
the legislator; we too have judicial review of statutes which unlawfully
infringe upon constitutionally protected human rights; we too have a
written constitution, to which the Knesset in its capacity as legislator is
subject and which cannot alter. 156
Owen Fiss described this endeavor by drawing on a variety of sources, including
statutes and customary international law. More importantly however, President Barak
derived the necessity for a judicial mechanism from "theoretical reflections on the
requirements of democracy." 157 Under President Barak's understanding, democracy rests
on two pillars. The first is popular sovereignty, i.e. elections in which the people choose
their representatives who, in turn, represent their views. This formal pillar, a hallmark of
which is majority rule, does not, however, sufficiently address the rights of the
minorityl58 as well as other issues that are crucial for democracy.1 59 The centrality of
this second aspect of democracy for the jurisprudential position of President Barak
becomes clear when he posits that without substantive aspects of democracy - namely
separation of powers, rule of law, judicial independence, human rights, and basic
principles that reflect other values, social objectives and appropriate ways of behavior a system of governance cannot be called a democracy.160 Indeed, this dual view of
democracy was specifically espoused in the court's Bank Mizrahi opinion.161
The Bank Mizrahi decision, the importance of which was largely unnoticed at first
because of the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on the preceding day, came under heavy
criticism for empowering the Supreme Court in ways that the Basic Laws had not
envisioned. 162 And while it is true that modern constitutions generally provide for
judicial review,163 and even more established constitutional systems adopt judicial
review,164 the argument for judicial review is more difficult to maintain in the absence of
express constitutional provisions to that effect. Given President Barak's proclivity for
using comparative law, it is unsurprising that the judgment reflects on modern

156. Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalizationof the Israeli Legal System as a Result of the Basic Laws and
Its Effect on Proceduraland Substantive Criminal Law,, 31 ISR. L. REV. 3, 3 (1997).
157. Owen Fiss, Law, Is Everywhere, 117 YALE L.J. 256, 271 (2007).
158.

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 78-79, 135-36 (1980);

Robert Post, Democracy, PopularSovereignty, and JudicialReview, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 429, 437 (1998).
159. Post, supra note 158, at 438.
160. BARAK, supranote 39, at 23-24, 33-38.
161. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD 221, para. 80 [1995] (Isr.)
(opinion
of
President
Shamgar),
available
at
http:/
elyon1.court.gov.il/files eng/93/210/068/zOl/93068210.z01.pdf. For academic precursors, see RONALD
DWORKIN, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BRITAIN 35 (1990).

162. Gavison, supra note 153, at 522-23.
163.

ToM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES

33 (2003); Ackerman, supra note 9, at 781; David Deener, Judicial Reviewt in Modern ConstitutionalSystems,
46 AM. POL. ScL REv. 1079, 1090, 1098 (1952).
164. See generally Ariel L. Bendor & Zeev Segal, Constitutionalism and Trust in Britain: An Ancient
ConstitutionalCulture, A New JudicialReview Model, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 683 (2002).
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constitutional structures and finds that the "twentieth century is the century of judicial
review." 1 65 Even more important appears to be the dual nature of democracy described
above. The judgment even contends that:
[W]hoever argues that judicial review is undemocratic is in effect
arguing that the constitution itself is undemocratic. To maintain that
judicial review is undemocratic is to maintain that safeguarding human
rights is undemocratic. To maintain that judicial review is
undemocratic is to maintain that defending the rights of the individual
against the majority is undemocratic.166
At the very least, President Barak's view is internally consistent. He, like
others,167 defends judicial review as a prerequisite for the existence of a substantive
democracy, holistically understood, as opposed to merely a formal democracy. Holding
otherwise could tip the balance of power between the separate branches of government
and may leave the rights of the minority without adequate protection. It is, at least
implicitly, also a rejection of the Waldronian conception "that right-bearers have the
right to resolve disagreements about what rights they have among themselves and on
roughly equal terms" as the "only plausible rights-based theory of authority." 168 These
efforts have indeed changed Israel's constitutional system in a fundamental way.
The Achilles' heel of this design of course is that the Knesset could, by enacting
another Basic Law, roll back the achievements that have been made since Mizrahi.169
The justices were cognizant of this potential challenge and fused the new review power
with deep constitutional principles to hedge against the intrusion by the legislature. 170
This type of analysis is reminiscent of the jurisprudence of other supreme and
constitutional courts, and variably uses terms such as "unconstitutional constitutional
provision" (verfassungswidrige Verfassungsnormen) in the case of Germanyl71 or

"common law constitutionalism" in the case of Canada. 172 Through the societal
entrenchment of these values over time it has progressively become more difficult for a
legislature to do exactly what it could, in theory, set out to do. It is here where both
165. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD 221, para. 80 [1995] (lsr.),
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files eng/93/210/068/zO/93068210.zOl.pdf.
166. Id.
167. For a similar view, see generally ELY, supra note 161; Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to
JudicialReview, 92 VA. L. Rev. 991 (2006). But see David Enoch, Taking DisagreementSeriously: On Jeremy
Waldron 's Law and Disagreement, 39 ISR. L. REV. 22 (2006).
168. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 254 (1999).

169. There have been repeated attempts to curb the power of the Supreme Court from a number of political
actors. See Doron Navot & Yoav Peled, Towards a Constitutional Counter-Revolution in Israel?, 16
CONSTELLATIONS 429 passim (2009).

170. Weill, supranote 146, at 25.
171. The concept of unconstitutional constitutional amendments is explicitly dealt with in the German
Constitution in Article 79(3), which states: "Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the
Federation into Lander, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in
Articles I and 20 shall be inadmissible." GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I at art. 79(3) (Ger.); see also decision of the
German Constitutional Court in BVerfGE 1, 14 of Oct. 23, 1951 (Ger.), with an early critique of the concept by
OTTO BACHOF, VERFASSUNGSWIDRIGE VERFASSUNGSNORMEN? (1951).

172. Thomas Poole, Questioning Common Lawu Constitutionalism, 25 LEGAL STUD. 142 passim (2005);
Mark D. Walters, The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as FundamentalLaw,
51 U. TORONTO L.J. 91 passim (2001).
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legitimate criticisms may be raised, but also where, in the case of Israel, careful
constitutional jurisprudence has advanced the cause of the charged type of democracy
described by President Barak. 173
The need for a strong protection of the rights of (disenfranchised) individuals from
the perspective of the Court can also be seen in its jurisprudence regarding human
dignity. Since the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty contains only a limited
number of human rights guarantees, the Supreme Court developed a broad conception of
human dignity.1 74 Under this conception, dignity "is the source from which all other
human rights are derived," and it "unites the other rights into a whole." 175 In this
context, comparative law has played a critical role. The interpretation of dignity has been
influenced considerably by the jurisprudence of its German sister court,176 but has, in its
detail, far surpassed - in terms of breadth and depthl77 - the jurisprudence of the
GCC. Dignity, according to President Barak, encompasses equality, personal selfdetermination (or freedom of will), physical or mental welfare, and finally, the right not
be objectified, with the latter encompassing a number of due process rights. 178
In the framework developed above, this manner of influence qualifies President
Barak as a recipient of foreign sources, sometimes silently, sometimes openly
acknowledging the origin of his thinking. However, the scope and scale of the issue
posed is a distinguishing factor between the typical examples of this mode of
transnational legal communication. Oftentimes, such transnational legal communication
is concerned with narrow questions focused on a particular subject matter and not with
the construction of an entire set of constitutional principles. 179
Comparative law played a crucial role in the elucidation of all of these areas,
regardless of whether this concerned the fundamental requirements of democracy, the
development of the Court's human rights jurisprudence, or the conception of principles
such as proportionality.180 It is less clear what impact the Court's own jurisprudence and particularly the one during President Barak's tenure - has had on its sister
institutions in other countries. There is little overt evidence that this has been the case.
Unlike other studies that have tried to trace the influence of foreign courts' decisions on
sister institutions,181 no such study exists for the Supreme Court of Israel. Additionally,
there are only a small number of decisions in the United States that specifically mention
173. Nevertheless, there has been opposition to finalizing what has been called the piecemeal approach to
this constitutional proiect. See Rabin and Shany, supra note 154, at 313-27. On the notion of Israel having a
piecemeal constitution, see Hirschl, supranote 148, at 429.
174. BARAK, supranote 39, at 85-87.
175. Id. at 85.
176. lzhak Englard, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel s Constitutional Framework, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 1903, 1923-24 (2000).
177. For a critical voice on the bench on the breadth of the concept of dignity, see the opinion of Justice
Dorner, HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Def 49(4) PD 94 [1995] (lsr.). For a critical review, see David
Kretzmer, Human Digniy in Israeli Jurisprudence, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS

DISCOURSE 161, 161-62 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002).
178. BARAK, supranote 39, at 86-87.
179. Jabareen, supranote 139, at 2, 4.
180. BARAK, supranote 39, at 197-200.
181. See generally Gelter & Siems, Networks, Dialogue or One-Way Traffic? An Empirical Analysis of
Cross-Citationsbetween Ten European Supreme Courts, supra note 24; Gelter & Siems, Language, Legal
Origins, and Culture before the Courts: Cross-Citationsbetween Supreme Courts in Europe, supra note 24.
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decisions by the Supreme Court of Israel for their jurisprudential viewl82 and outside of
cases which deal with a subject matter directly related to Israel. 183
The situation is not markedly different for other foreign courts. This stands in
somewhat sharp contrast to the attention that is being paid to Israel politically. Indeed,
even in jurisdictions that are known to be outward-looking, the number of references to
the jurisprudence (as opposed to a specific case) is very small.184 Importantly however,
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has been taken up in the context of reviewing
anti-terrorist measures in both Canada 1 85 and the U.K. 186 The U.K. Court of Appeal
quoted at length the Supreme Court's decision in Public Committee against Torture in
Israel v. The Government oflsrael and considered the decision to reflect
a basic truth which applies in any jurisdiction where public power is
subject to the rigour of democracy and the rule of law. It is that State
power is not only constrained by objective law - that is, the imperative
that it be exercised fairly, reasonably and in good faith and within the
limits of any relevant statute. More than this: the imperative is one
which cannot be set aside on utilitarian grounds, as a means to a
further end. It is not in any way to be compromised.1 87
There are a number of reasons that may explain the lack of citation to the Supreme
Court of Israel's jurisprudence, however. While the most important judgments are being
translated, the language barrier goes some way towards explaining the lack of reference
by foreign courts.] 88 A number of countries simply do not cite foreign jurisprudence,
either for fear of being accused of adopting foreign judgments without proper
authorization to do so189 or because judges have not done so historically, 190 i.e. citing
foreign judgments has never been part of the judicial culture. 191 There may also be

182. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd, 517
F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008).
183. Denianjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993) (involving extradition to Israel of alleged Nazi
war criminal); In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. 778 F. Supp. 625, 640 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
(involving Israeli decision suggesting that common law nations endorse psychic damages resulting from
physical injuries), rev d, 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992).
184. For example, see the Canadian Supreme Court making reference to the Supreme Court of Israel in
Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607, paras. 149-53 (Can.), and the Federal Court of Australia in Sryyy v
Ministerfor Immigration & Multicultural& Indigenous Affairs (2005) 220 ALR. 394, para. 122 (Austl.).
185. Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren Michaeli, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of
Israel, Case No. HCJ 769/02, 101 A.M. J. INT'L. L. 459, 460 (2007). See generally Application under s. 83.28
of the Criminal Code (Re), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248 (Can.).
186. A & Ors. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1123, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 414 (U.K.).
187. Id. at paras. 250-51 (citing HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 53(4) PD 817,
para. 39 [1999] (Isr.)). The cited decision, one of the most famous decisions of the Supreme Court of Israel and
itself making use of other courts' jurisprudence, posits that "[a] democracy must sometimes fight with one hand
tied behind its back." HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 53(4) PD 817, para. 39 [1999]
(lsr.).
188. See reference made by the European Court of Human Rights' Grand Chamber judgment in Evans v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 49 (Apr. 10, 2007).
189. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003), although it appears that this type of criticism does
not appear to the same extent as it does in the US.
190.

GUIDO ALPA, TRADITION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN ITALIAN LAW (2005).

191. Basil Markesinis, JudicialMentality: Mental Disposition or Outlook as a FactorImpeding Recourse to
Foreign Law, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1325 passim (2006); see also HIGHEST COURTS AND
INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: CHALLENGES AND CHANGES (Sam Mueller & Marc Loth eds., 2009).
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personal preferences that lead a judge to not disclose the source for their jurisprudential
reasoning. In such instances, which are not necessarily limited to foreign law or
international law influences, it may be impossible to know whether a foreign court's
jurisprudence ultimately played a role in how a court reached its conclusion.

IV.

CONCLUSION

What this article has attempted to do is to build upon and expand the framework of
transjudicial communication. It applied this expanded framework - coined transnational
legal communication - to the legacy of former President of the Supreme Court of Israel,
Aharon Barak. There are lacunae in this description, and this kind of typology does not
do justice to the often self-reinforcing elements. As is true so often, especially here, the
sum is far greater than its parts.
President Barak most forcefully rebutted the arguments against the use of
comparative law when he stated that originalism "does not take democracy seriously
enough."l 92 One of President Barak's most vocal critics - Justice Scalia - commented
that President Barak had a greater impact on his own legal system than any other justice
before him, and beyond that he probably had the greatest impact on other systems around
the world of justices alive today.193 Naturally, his detractors, of which there are many
from a great variety of ideological camps, claim that President Barak's regrettable
international influence only served to further anti-democratic tendencies through
'judicial authoritarianism."l94 Richard Posner criticizes him for pushing a political
ideology in the name of democracy without being democratically accountable,
dismissing any comparisons one may draw in his jurisprudence on the basis of Israel
having a corrupt and underdeveloped political and legal system. 19 5 Others have found
his legacy "disappointing" because of the perceived lack of protection of human rights,
e.g. in the occupied territories. 196
What this careful balancing act between advancing the protection of human rights
on one hand and navigating the convoluted interplay between the political institutions,
especially in a country like Israel, on the other requires is a judge who is sensitive to the
role accorded to her or him in a society. In The Judge in a Democracy, President Barak
posits that "law is everywhere." 197 This outlook differs considerably from that of other
courts. Most notably is the contrast to the U.S. system with its largely deferential attitude
towards executive decision-making. 19 8 If, however, that statement is accepted and if, on
192. Barak, supra note 127. This is further elaborated on in BARAK, supra note 39, at 133-35.
193.

Antonin Scalia, quoted in Benjamin Soskis, Judging Aharon, THE JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (July 10,

2007), http://www.forward.com/articles/ 11114/.
194. Robert H. Bork, Barak's Rule, Winter 5767 AZURE 125, 127, 131 (2007) (reviewing AHARON BARAK,
THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY (2006).

195. Posner, supranote 143.
196. Nimer Sultany, The Legacy of Justice Aharon Barak: A Critical Review, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE

83, 83 (Apr. 30, 2007).
197. BARAK, supra note 39, at 309.

198. For a fundamentally different conception in U.S. administrative law, see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Similarly, Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
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that basis, legal constraints bind the executive even in times of war (using this
terminology with all necessary precautions), it is imperative that legal principles are not
readily shelved for political expediency. In the case of President Barak, this was most
apparent in the decisions concerning national security. Despite the constant state of threat
that Israel is under, the decisions he authored did not give the executive free reign but
rather maintained that human dignityl99 and limited powers200 prevail.201 While it can
be argued that the nature of threats in Israel and the United States have historically
differed considerably, the exceptional nature of war time in Israel has never justified the
high degree of deference afforded the executive in the United States. 202
Judge Calabresi said that "[w]ise parents do not hesitate to learn from their
children."203 It seems fitting to remember this quote from his concurrence in U.S. v.
Then. Not only did President Barak influence-as even his critics note-other courts and
judges around the world, but he himself was also influenced by those same courts and
judges. He taught others, but also learned from them. President Barak has been
influenced by his careful consideration of foreign sources and comparative law. He has
been both a creator and an internalizer of foreign and international norms. His greatest
legacy however goes well beyond the immediate decisions that he rendered while on the
court. More importantly than those decisions is the change in legal thinking his
jurisprudence has brought about during his tenure and beyond.

Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 passim (1989). For a critical perspective, see
Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of
Deference with the Judiciarys Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. I passim (2000). For a comparative
perspective between Israel and the United States, see Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, Going Toe to Toe:
PresidentBarak s and ChiefJustice Rehnquist s Theories ofJudicialActivism, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 51 (2005); see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WAR TIME

225 (1st ed. 1998) (Rehnquist pointing out that laws "will speak with a somewhat different voice" during war
time).
199. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 53(4) PD 817, paras. 24-25, 27 [1999] (Isr.).
200. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. [2006] (Isr.), available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/fileseng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf. For another important decision on
detention requirements, see generally HCJ 7957/04 Mara abe v. Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477 [2005]
(Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/fileseng/04/570/079/al4/04079570.al4.htm. For a decision
concerning questions of a humanitarian nature, see generally HCJ 4764/04 Physiciansfor Human Rights v. IDF
Commander in Gaza 58(5) PD 385 passim [2004] (Isr.).
201. For a more theoretical discussion, see generally Barak, supra note 132.
202. This of course presupposes, as Janice Rogers Brown suggests, a positive view of judges as
"unproblematic protectors of individual liberties," whereas it can well be argued that "judges themselves are
part of the government, [they] help command the coercive apparatus of the state, and can themselves be a
source of illiberal power," and in essence be "highly problematic protectors of individual liberty." Hon. Janice
Rogers Brown, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Lecture given at the Univ. of Haifa: Liberty and
Limited Government: The Role of a Judge in a Democratic Society 4-5 (Dec. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.fulbright.org.il/fileadmin/fulbright/editor/Files/JBrownBarak sympspeech.doc.
203. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995). For a similar point, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
"A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]Kind": The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 26 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 187, 187 (2007).
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